

Deja Vu: Can We Be Ready For The Next War?

CSC 1997

Subject Area - General

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** Deja Vu: Can we be ready for the next war?

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**Thesis:** A nation can never be truly ready for war but the military must develop doctrine which allows; acquisition of required equipment and technology, development of appropriate training programs, and consolidates service responsibilities to reduce redundancy.

**Background:** The American culture has historically focused on its primary concern, the rights and needs of the individual citizen. American's highest priority is the promotion of domestic economical issues to further that concern. Only when a vital national interest is threatened will this focus shift, albeit temporarily, away from this domestic issue. The United States has proven time and again that it can not be ready for major military conflicts, they need a swift kick in the pants to get them going. As always, there are situations not vital to our national interest that beckon for national attention, often from a moral perspective. Today, military forces are often utilized in these situations, regardless of suitability to conduct such operations, because they exist and, in the eyes of some, have nothing better to do. Aspects of readiness, such as morale and training become secondary to the national need to answer these calls to duty. Elements of American culture, procurement practices, doctrine and military strategy are key to the understanding of this topic.

**Recommendation:** The United States needs a military strategy that fulfills two basic requirements. First considering the reduced budget and size of the military and the abundance of employment opportunities in the world, operational tempo has to be controlled to maintain morale and allow for critical issues such as training, maintenance, professional military education, and modernization of forces while not depleting the budget. The United States should not abstain from operations of a lesser criticality to our national interests, but, the tempo has to be controlled at the highest level, in a predetermined manner, to allow budgetary relief and the conduct of unrelated sustainment activities. The Nation must utilize its preeminent leadership position to initiate and coordinate appropriate responses, either political or military, to world issues that threaten international stability, even if not directly related to a vital national interest. Finally, it is mandatory that the nation have an established mobilization strategy to compensate for a smaller force structure. The second basic requirement is to establish doctrine that coordinates and consolidates the goals of the nation's various services. This doctrine must establish individual, unit, and joint training requirements and promote open

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communication within and between services to maximize economy of scale and synergistic procurement practices. The services must truly buy into jointness and demonstrate cooperation for the good of the entire military without feeling threatened by sister services.

## **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

A nation can never be totally ready for war. There is a psychological aspect of war for which one can not prepare. Nations can only gain psychological preparedness by suffering a loss of such magnitude as to focus and solidify popular will for the required sacrifices. America's reaction to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor beginning the Second World War is a clear example of this process. If one accepts this concept of restricted readiness, the best that one can hope for is that a nation's military can be ready, in every other way, to seize the advantage once popular will has emerged. Historically, the U.S. military has been ill-prepared to seize the advantage at the onset of war. There has been a cycle of preparedness and unpreparedness, one repeated time and again. The generic cycle is as follows: It begins with the emergence of a major threat. That threat causes Congress to increase the military budget to revitalize forces. When sufficiently manned, trained, and outfitted, military forces undertake operations to attain a desired end state. With the termination of hostilities, Congress decreases the military budget to compensate for the high levels of wartime expenditures. Reduced budgets cause military organizations to downsize and restructure and military capabilities decay. Operational tempo during this other-than-war period directly impacts on the breadth and depth of decay. The degree of success the military will ultimately enjoy during a conflict is predicated by the occurrence of an event that rallies the will of the people and the degree to which it does so.

The military must prepare during periods of relative peace for the eventuality of war. However, the military preparations can not occur in a vacuum; they occur within the prevailing economic and political environment and are consonant with constraints that may exist. America has been fortunate in the past and has often had the luxury of time that has allowed rejuvenation of its military forces during times of crisis. The impact could be devastating should this factor not be present. At the onset of hostilities military forces are often employed in delaying operations to trade space for time. Time has always been critical as a result of the United State's historical need to prepare its "Big Stick," that is mobilize, equip, train, and deploy its forces. The forces used to provide this delaying action have often fared badly due to the lack of preparedness. At the extreme, this lack of preparedness could subject the nation to an operational defeat in which it could lose numerous battle groups or divisions. An operational defeat, unlike the tactical defeats the nation has previously suffered, might challenge the nation's very existence. Can this cycle be broken? Can this tendency to be ill-prepared for the onset of war be reversed? This paper proposes to determine how today's military environment of budgetary restraint and post cold war draw down affects the ability to prepare for war. The research will analyze two different, yet similar, military operations when the U.S. military was drawn into war while unprepared. The events in the two military operations will be synthesized, then compared and contrasted with the circumstances in which America's military finds itself today.

## **SUB-PROBLEMS**

This research paper will organize the following sub-problems to facilitate discussion of the topic. Each sub-problem addresses constraints present in the current environment and serves to identify efficient uses of limited resources: The first sub-problem is American culture, its people, and politics, as they relate to support for military operations and the forces required to conduct those operations during periods when vital national interests are not threatened. The second sub-problem is the current military strategy, to determine probable operational tempo and its influence on the American military's preparations for war. The third sub-problem is present joint doctrine, to determine if it facilitates adequate preparations for military action the next time a vital national interest is threatened. The fourth sub-problem is to analyze current procurement practices to determine how to maximize the use of limited resources in preparations for war.

## **HYPOTHESIS**

The first hypothesis is that American culture supports the armed forces when required to respond to threats to vital national interests. Alternatively, when no apparent threat to vital national interests exists, short-term domestic economic issues override military requirements. Military requirements remain secondary until such time when challenges to vital national interests again appear and the sacrifice of Americans again becomes probable. The second hypothesis is that America's military strategy currently calls for the capability to conduct operations in two simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, major regional conflicts. However, in the absence of a major regional conflict, military

operational tempo will remain at high levels while conducting Operations Other Than War(OOTW). These high levels of military operational tempo will be destructive to the long range readiness of America's armed forces. The third hypothesis is that current doctrine does not facilitate adequate preparations for military action the next time a vital national interest is threatened. The fourth hypothesis is that procurement practices must fully accommodate the theories of jointness on a cultural level to ensure maximization of limited resources.

## **RESEARCH OF RELATED LITERATURE**

### **HISTORY OF ILL-PREPAREDNESS**

Prior to the American Revolution, the colonists formed small militia units to facilitate their safety and continental expansion. They fought primarily with the native Indians, and found it easier to destroy Indian settlements and crops than to oppose them directly.<sup>1</sup> Later, conflicts grew more intense as European forces and Indians gravitated to opposing sides. These more intense conflicts required larger forces and extended service and the British Army did most of the fighting vice militia units.<sup>2</sup> When Americans conducted the first battles of the Revolutionary War, they opposed, for the first time, a large conventional army. Additionally, they had never fought a general conventional action and had limited experience managing the kind of forces needed for real war.<sup>3</sup> This seemingly insurmountable obstacle turned out less problematic than it might have, since the Americans usually possessed superior knowledge of local terrain. Revolutionary

soldiers, in keeping with American tradition, overcame their disadvantages as the war continued, and gained valuable experience from military defeats.

This paper will examine two historical accounts of the American ill-preparedness during the nation's entry into hostilities. These two accounts will facilitate the analysis and comparison of history to the current environment. The two accounts are; The U.S. campaign of North African, that brought American military forces into the European theater In World War II, and the operations of Task Force Smith that initiated American participation in the Korean conflict.

**THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN, WORLD WAR II:** The United States, eager to establish a second front in Europe, committed itself to a 1943 cross-channel assault into France. This commitment came in response to repeated Russian demands for relief. U.S. initiatives to conduct a smaller scale amphibious assault into France in 1942, however, led Winston Churchill, Britain's Prime Minister, to propose an alternative invasion of Northwestern Africa in 1942 to hasten relief for the Soviet Union.

President Franklin Roosevelt committed U.S. forces to an invasion of Northwest Africa at the earliest possible date, selected Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Allied Supreme Commander for the invasion, code named TORCH. Eisenhower's directive was to gain control of North Africa from the Atlantic to Tunisia starting with landings in Algeria and French Morocco. Eisenhower would strike eastward after taking French North Africa and take General Erwin Rommel's German-Italian Panzer Army, the African Corps, in Libya from the rear and to clear that country of Axis forces.<sup>4</sup>



On 8 November 1942, the landings took place. The landings were successful, though disorganized and badly conducted. The three landing sites met sporadic French resistance. The Eastern Task Force at Algiers met light resistance that subsided by evening. At Oran, The Center Task Force was largely unopposed during the landing, but met heavy resistance ashore through 10 November. At Casablanca, the Western Task Force saw the heaviest resistance from French ships and shore-based guns and ground forces. The fighting ended on 11 November due primarily to political actions. American forces believed they had been tested in battle; their morale was high and they were confident in their abilities to face the German Army.<sup>5</sup> Their first true test was yet to come. Eisenhower initiated the race for Tunisia and placed Major General Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson in overall command. Poor rail and road systems delayed allied movement forward while Hitler poured in reinforcements, commanded by Gen. Jurgen Von Arnim.<sup>6</sup> The Allies made a series of landings, both amphibious and airborne, as they traversed eastward along the northern coast of Africa. The first real contact occurred on 17 November and Eisenhower committed U.S. Troops to the front. In February, the Axis powers began an offensive designed to cut the Allied forces' lines of communications. Arnim and Rommel converged in the Kasserine Plains area in an attempt to split American and French forces. The U.S. II Corps, in the Kasserine area, took the brunt of the German assault. The German attack overwhelmed Allied positions and forced a withdrawal through the pass. Allied losses were heavy, but they held newly formed positions just through the pass.<sup>7</sup> This severe setback typifies the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct combat initially. Issues relating to U.S. military effectiveness are:

Personnel: Rapid demobilization after World War I had reduced the Regular Army to 110,000 men by 1936. By 1939 the Army was authorized 210,000 men but had fewer than 190,000 scattered, usually in battalions, among 130 posts, camps, and stations.<sup>8</sup> Its personnel were mostly garrison soldiers who had known only what the British Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge once called "the cancer of the long peace." Such a period, Bridge said, "Fosters faulty methods, pedantic procedures, and the spirit of the parade ground, which are usually the first casualties of war."<sup>9</sup>

Doctrine: The doctrine that prevailed at the onset of this campaign, largely left over from World War I, was updated only slightly after studying the blitzkrieg tactics practiced by the German Army. U.S. doctrine placed a very heavy emphasis on artillery fire and carefully controlled movement. During the interwar period the basic ground formation was the square-type infantry division.<sup>10</sup> Doctrine for air power in support of ground forces was yet to be developed. Unit training did not occur above the battalion level until after the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. The basic U.S. Army division was reduced in size and reorganized in a new triangular structure. The 1st Armored Division was created and a phase of training and reorganization began that eventually produced a considerable number of armored divisions. The result by November 1942 was a flexible, high infantry ratio organization containing three infantry battalions and two tank regiments of three battalions each. When the 1st Armored Division sailed toward North Africa in November 1942, its tank complement included two Battalions of light tanks armed with the 37-mm gun, three battalions of medium tanks armed with the low-velocity 75-mm gun, and one battalion of early model Sherman medium tanks.<sup>11</sup>

The use of aviation assets in close support of ground forces was virtually a new concept for Americans. The German's had developed effective close fire support doctrine during early stages of the war in Europe. Their example provided useful lessons as Allied forces developed their own philosophies. In the North African campaign the German Second Air Force, Luftflotte 2, had played a considerable role during initial engagements, while the German-Italian forces enjoyed localized air superiority. As the North African campaign developed, Allied forces gained experience under fire and developed tactics and doctrine for the employment of supporting arms to include aviation as well as artillery units. Still, the lack of a coherent air-ground doctrine led to multiple blue on blue engagements throughout the campaign.<sup>12</sup>

Procurement: The inadequacy of armor and fire power when compared with that of the Germans was not suspected until U.S. forces met the Germans in Tunisia.<sup>13</sup> The German Mark IV tank could take multiple direct hits from any Allied anti-tank system with little effect. U.S. tank units, with their short barrel 75mm guns, had deployed with the high explosive rounds normally used during training exercises, for little armored piercing ordnance was available. As the campaign progressed, new and improved ordnance (tank rounds) was developed and supplied that could effectively penetrate the Mark IV tank. On the other hand, the heavy guns of the Mark IVs could destroy the Allied main battle tank with a single round. Infantry antitank weaponry consisted of the new 2.36 inch "Bazooka." Developed in mid-1942, the Bazooka was issued to tank-destroyer battalions and because training only began in December 1942, no one really knew how to use one. Moreover, the bazooka proved to be of little use until improved projectiles were developed.<sup>14</sup>

German preparations during the interwar period had focused on the concepts of maneuver and movement. The Germans developed doctrine to facilitate these concepts. The doctrine of Blitzkrieg, or lightning war, combined the mobility requirements of equipment and the maneuver aspects of organization. The effects of this new and different conduct of operations had been apparent during earlier operations in Europe. The U.S. Army had begun studying Blitzkrieg tactics early during the German Army's European campaigns. The major German advantage came with the development of a coherent, realistic, and effective doctrine. Not having the luxury of time, U.S. forces had to concentrate on countermeasures that relied on the use of equipment currently available. The M-4 Sherman tank, newly developed, was proven in battle and, while not as powerful as the Mark IV, with modifications would prove effective in later stages of the campaign.

The Tunisian campaign represented the bloodying of U.S. Military forces in the European and Mediterranean Theaters of operations. Mostly untrained, inexperienced personnel planned and conducted the campaign with inferior equipment. As the campaign progressed, the learning curve was gradually improved. Techniques for command and control of war fighting units were honed, especially at the tactical and operational levels. Troops learned from their errors, though they paid a high price. The 30,000 men of the II Corps suffered over 20 percent casualties: three hundred dead, three thousand wounded, and another three thousand missing and/or taken prisoner.<sup>15</sup> Had the Allied forces conducted operations directly into Northwest France, without first having this experience, the consequences would probably have proven disastrous.

**TASK FORCE SMITH: THE KOREAN CONFLICT:** Again, when World War II ended, the American military suffered from drastic demobilization. "Bring the boys home, the war is won" was the prevailing sentiment for most Americans. It was time once again to reap the economic benefits of having won the war.

In 1942, in a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Army General George C. Marshall described the stakes of the post World War II demobilization graphically.

If the army failed to shoulder the "hideous responsibility" of mustering out its men efficiently, he said, "We are going to wreck our reputation on the heels of what we hope is victory." "This will be the final triumph if we put this over, and if it isn't, then it will damn us and ruin all that we have done."<sup>16</sup>

Fresh from the experiences of war and the depression, America was ready for a period of prosperity and peace. The forces that would later see action in Korea were in Japan performing occupation duties. Senior military leadership focused on restructuring their forces to compensate for budget reductions and down sizing. By the time the North Korean People's Army crossed the demilitarized zone, established at the end of World War II to separate Soviet and American troops, the forces eventually organized into Task Force (TF) Smith had deteriorated to the point of being almost totally noneffective.

LTC Charles B. Smith received the phone call to establish and deploy his task force at approximately 10:30 P.M., 30 June 1950. Five days later, on 5 July 1950 at 08:16 A.M., his task force would engage the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). TF Smith loaded on six C-54 transport aircraft destined for Pusan, Korea on 1 July, and critical heavy equipment followed them to Korea via sea lift a couple weeks later. Upon arrival in Korea, Smith scouted northward and finally selected, prepared, and occupied

positions approximately three miles north of Osan on a ridgeline to meet the advancing NKPA. At 07:00, 5 July 1950, TF Smith observed NKPA T-34 tanks approaching from the north. It took the lead tank elements under indirect fire at about 08:15 and caused the NKPA infantry to scatter and take cover. 105MM high explosive rounds scored direct hits with no effect. Even the high explosive antitank rounds (HEAT), of which the Americans had only been able to gather 6, bounced off the T-34's. The 75mm recoilless rifles were fired at distances of no more than 700 yards scoring direct hits, but to no effect.<sup>17</sup> TF Smith engaged thirtythree T-34 tanks but only four were put out of action. After seven hours of intense battle, ammunition almost gone, flanked by the NKPA, and in danger of being over-run, Smith gave the order to withdraw. TF Smith had fought well for a makeshift group of inexperienced, poorly equipped, and virtually untrained soldiers. For the following seventeen days Eighth Army, mainly the 24th Division, attempted to thwart the advancing NKPA with little success. Yet in the end, these actions delayed the NKPA and facilitated the defeat of their attack on South Korea. Pusan held and provided the lodgment from which the counter attack was to ensue.

It was necessary for these young men to pay the price of unpreparedness with their blood. In keeping with U.S. traditions, corrections were quickly made; upgraded equipment was provided, new training practices implemented, and critical experience gained. The U.S. has never taken lightly the prospect of defeat. The problem is not that Americans are soft but that they simply will not face what war is all about until they have had their teeth kicked in.<sup>18</sup> Regardless of military preparedness, politicians will consider military forces a viable political tool, open for use at the worst possible time. Readiness issues relating to this account are:

Personnel: Following the Second World War, unlike previous wars, the population in general held senior military personnel in high regard. Senior military personnel enjoyed this popularity and were reluctant to take actions that might jeopardize it. However, large numbers of civilians who had served in World War II did not like the service. When, as usual after all American wars, there came a great civilian clamor to change all the things in the army the civilians had not liked.<sup>19</sup> The fact that changes were made is not the issue, but that they were changed without outlining the necessary accountability.

The Doolittle Board of 1945-1946 met, listened to less than half a hundred complaints, and made its recommendations. The so-called "caste system" of the Army was modified. Captains, by fiat, had suddenly ceased to be gods, and sergeants, the hard-bitten backbone of any army, were told to try to be just some of the boys. Junior officers had a great deal of their power to discipline taken away from them. They could no longer inflict any real punishment, short of formal court-martial, nor could they easily reduce ineffective N.C.O.'s. Understandably, their own powers shaky, they cut the ground completely away from under their N.C.O.'s.<sup>20</sup>

Following the Doolittle Board, the life of the occupying forces in Japan bore little resemblance to that of military duty of the past. Of the four Army Divisions in Japan, three were below their authorized peacetime strength of 12,500, a figure which was itself 66 percent of the wartime strength of 18,900.<sup>21</sup> Occupation duty became a routine 0800 to 1700 job. New recruits began to appear, lured by the GI Bill, recruits who cared little about being prepared for war. Combat veterans of all ranks found it hard to give up habits formed during the war and heavy drinking and venereal disease became major problems. The new arrivals found an adventure in a new land, and to compound the problem, many took up residence with Japanese women outside the bases.

Procurement: The disappointing performance of the weapons systems employed by TF Smith was a major factor in the tragedy. Since the end of World War II, new ground weapons had been developed, but few had been procured. There were plenty of the old arms around but many, retrieved from the island campaigns, were not even serviceable. Rifle barrels were worn smooth, mortar mounts were broken, and no spare barrels for machine guns were available. Radios were in short supply, and, those that were available, seldom worked. Nor was ammunition, except for small arms, to be found. The state of unit material disrepair was known and reported up the chain of command, even to Congress. But usually the answer was "next year." Even a rich society cannot afford nuclear bombs, supercarriers, foreign aid, five million new cars a year, long-range bombers, the highest standard of living in the world and a million new rifles. Somewhere the U.S. government had to choose.<sup>22</sup> It chose badly.

Training: Compounding the lack of equipment and the state of disrepair of what was available, training was virtually nonexistent. Though NCOs with World War II experience were in positions of responsibility, for a variety of reasons, having such veterans to conduct training, was not always advantageous. In any event, had individuals been superbly trained in tactical matters, units would reap little benefit without exercises to facilitate coordination and employment. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur issued a training directive to the Eighth Army in June 1949 to reverse the neglect of training. The directive called for company level training to be completed by December 1949, battalion level by May 1950, and regimental level by December 1950.<sup>23</sup> Various CPX's and a few battalion level field exercises were conducted, but even if the proposed schedule had been executed it would not have been in time for the NKPA's June invasion.



Exercises that were conducted produced considerable learning, but the reported results of training was exaggerated, while no live fire exercises were conducted due to the absence of facilities and ammunition in Japan.

The lack of discipline created by the Doolittle Board further exacerbated the situation. A fighting force without discipline may be capable of close order drill, but, when faced with an advancing, determined enemy, they are likely to turn tail and run at the first sign of distress, as many were to do during the initial NKPA onslaught. The prevailing softness of the occupation forces and of the U.S. military in general, brought on by the lack of basic unit level training, served them poorly in the combat to come. Many of America's young soldiers faced horror badly because they had never been told they would have to face horror, or that horror is normal in our insane world. It had not been ground into them that they would have to obey their officers, even if the orders got them killed.<sup>24</sup> In war for his own sake and those around him, fighting men must be prepared for the awful, shrieking moment of truth when they realize they are alone on a hill ten thousand miles from home, and that they may die at any second.<sup>25</sup> Basic training develops the discipline for the military to function in the environment created by war, and the men of TF Smith had not been given that benefit. As is always the case, the best training for combat is combat itself.

During the initial NKPA advance, American soldiers, T.R. Fehrenbach notes:

learned to travel light, but with full canteen and bandoleer, and to climb the endless hills. They learned to hold fast when the enemy flowed at them, because it was the safest thing to do. They learned to displace in good order when they had to. They learned to listen and obey. They learned all the things Americans have always learned from Appomattox to Berlin. Above all, they learned to kill.<sup>26</sup>

Political: During and after World War II weapons were developed which provided an enemy the ability to conduct large-scale attacks on the United States, eroding America's ability to withdraw from global affairs. Thus the U.S. had to remain engaged in the affairs of Europe and the Far East to a greater extent than ever before. This new found engagement stripped the U.S. of the luxury of mobilization at its normal, leisurely pace.

The U.S. devotion to thwarting communism culminated in Truman's 1949 NSC 68 which stated:

up to 20 percent of our gross national product would go to support the military and that the United States would resist communist threats to noncommunist nations anywhere in the world. This milestone document thus broke decisively with the policies we had pursued since our earliest days, which had granted only the most minimal role to our peacetime armed forces.<sup>27</sup>

Further, the President became the focal point for debate over the composition of the armed forces, the share of the budget that each would receive, and the future role of the atomic bomb. Being responsible for determining the military needs of the nation, he had to judge the merits of the service's claims regarding their respective funding requirements. Truman followed the desires of the American people and established policies calling for demilitarization to funnel money into domestic programs, while holding strongly to the concept that the atomic bomb was a force multiplier, the U.S. ace-in-the-hole! The shortcomings of this defense policy would be dramatically demonstrated July 1950, when America faced its first opportunity to stem the spread of communism on the battlefield.

The Korean conflict marked the emergence of a new kind of war, limited war. This limited war concept amplifies the requirement for readiness to meet national

responsibilities. Military operations during a limited war must be carefully conceived with the utmost attention to force protection. One must use extreme care against unacceptable losses when competing at less than 100 percent. The losses a nation will accept during such military operations are much less than during total war.

The Army could have fought World War III, just as it could have fought World War II, under the new rules. During 1941-1945 the average age of the United States soldier was in the late twenties, and the ranks were seasoned with maturity from every rank of life, as well as intelligence. In World War III, or any war with national support, this would have again been true. Soldiers would have brought their motivation with them, firmed by understanding and maturity. The Army could have fought World War III in 1950, but it could not fight Korea.<sup>28</sup>

The nation had lost its monopoly on atomic warfare when the Russians detonated its first atomic weapon. The United States' determination to oppose communism pulled us into a war in a place which had been identified as not vital to the national interest.

## ANALYSIS

### AMERICAN CULTURE

The first hypothesis is that American culture supports the armed forces when required to respond to threats to vital national interests. Alternatively, when no apparent threat to vital national interests exists, short-term domestic economic issues override military requirements. Military requirements remain secondary until such time when challenges to vital national interests again appear and the sacrifice of Americans again becomes probable. This hypothesis will be divided and discussed using the following topics: people, politics, budget, military strategy, and operational tempo.

**PEOPLE:** Clausewitz' Trinity outlines a nation's people--their inherent passions--as one of three sources of power.<sup>29</sup> As depicted in both examples, Americans are situationally enthusiastic toward military matters. When needed to protect the sovereignty of the state or to make the United States more prestigious on the world scene, the American people backed the military whole-heartedly. On the other hand, once the military had been employed and its mission accomplished, there is a universal call to withdraw support from the military. This withdrawal primarily manifested itself financially, but also comes in eroded popular support for military institutions as a whole. Major General Wilton B.

Persons, then Chief of the Army's Legislative and Liaison Division, wrote:

Until recently, Congress has responded to the Army as the desperate householder whose home in flames, welcomes the Fire Department; drive over the lawn, chop down the doors, throw the furniture out the window, but save the house. Now, with the flames under control, the Congress, like the householder, in noting for the first time the water damages and thinking that if the Fire Department had acted differently, the lawn would not be torn up, the doors smashed, and the furniture broken. The traditional fear Americans held of military ascendancy over civilian government and the desire of Congress to reassert its power spelled trouble for the services.<sup>30</sup>

Throughout U.S. history, many Americans held little value in the heroic deeds of the nation's military institutions and tend to regard the military as an alien element in society, a necessary evil.

Though the military is not fully supported during times of peace, for years it has been used to build character and provide a stepping stone into adulthood. Because it is our sons and daughters that comprise the military, the transition from peace to war has been difficult. As denoted in the previous examples, the American public must have some overwhelming justification, such as the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the attack on Korea, to become psychologically ready to put its military in harms way. Without this type of justification, a prevailing aversion to casualties can become an insurmountable obstacle to implementing the political will. In an attempt at alleviating this risk, the U.S. has slid toward the "magic bullet" concept, and attempted to find weapons that will create overwhelming superiority and guarantee success.

**POLITICS**: National priorities as defined in the Constitution were "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, and to provide for the common defense." Being the greatest power in the world, both economically and

militarily, carries certain psychological implications. The U.S. has six percent of the world's population but uses sixty percent of its goods and developed resources. Americans are convinced that the American way of life is the best in the world, that American management and enterprise are the best in the world, and that capitalism is the best tool for development.<sup>31</sup> From this point of view, U.S. political aims are to insure survival and to expand the economic and social institutions. The survival of the United States has been externally challenged only once since its birth; during World War II. At that time, three financially powerful and militarily capable nation states rose to challenge the balance of world power; Germany, Italy, and Japan. Only the inability of these three enemies to form an effective coalition, provided the United States and the rest of the world the time necessary to develop military forces that could ultimately defeat the aggressive powers. Prior to this war, America had rested on its geographic isolation and the relative strength of its allies, mainly England, and France. During World War II, these nations--with the addition of Russia--provided the time necessary for the United States to mobilize its military and enter the world conflict. Both examples demonstrate the difficulties associated with relying on others to stem the tide, but an important aspect of World War II is that never again would the United States be allowed the luxury of having allies buy time for its mobilization. In the future, as in the Korean conflict, the U.S. must be the first on scene and thus needs to have a standing military capability robust enough, at a minimum, to gain time to establish overwhelming combat power.

In the mid 1930s, rumblings from Japan drew the attention of senior military officials, who advised President Roosevelt that the country was not capable of opposing the Japanese navy in the Pacific. In January 1938, the President asked Congress for a

major increase in naval appropriations to meet this danger, but it takes a long time to produce a ship. Adding to the dilemma, the 1939 German invasion of Poland produced a declaration of war from both England and France, and when France collapsed in May 1940 a wave of despair ran through the United States. The President responded by championing the Lend-Lease bill to support England, and later Russia, so they could buy time for U.S. mobilization. The President also initiated the first peacetime draft to answer this call. Although the United States military is now an all volunteer force, in times of true national emergency, the country will likely return to a draft as it has in the past.

Vast and varied armaments have been built--land armies, seaborne and airborne forces--in the name of flexibility and greater freedom of action. Yet Americans have failed to recognize that the ability to wield this force generates a powerful temptation to use it. The existence of such forces places greater demands upon civilian leadership for wisdom and restraint, qualities which, as we sadly learned in Vietnam, may be lacking in the U.S. political system today.<sup>32</sup> The nation must determine how it will impose its view of the world on the remainder of civilization, what price it is willing to pay, and what methods it will employ to reach those ends. The situation existing today has not been created by the military establishment, but by the nation's civilian leadership. There is no focused picture. Without that focus, the military is being asked to determine what the military requirements are that will provide an adequate force to promote a national defense of an unknown type. Richard N. Goodwin, the Special Assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson put it this way:

Realistic policy has become virtually no policy at all, aside from maintaining the territorial status quo with Russia and China and hoping that Israel will survive. This policy has reached so sterile an ending because it is not guided by any clear perception of long-range goals or of the social and political forces at work on other continents. It lacks any ruling concept of the kind of world community in which we will be safest and most comfortable. It is, in other words, the ultimate romanticism of the ostrich.<sup>33</sup>

This comment was issued at a time when the threat of communism was universally accepted. In today's world, with the end of the Cold War, the threat has taken on a shapelessness that poses great difficulty. Without a well developed political end state, the military is hard pressed to determine how it will be utilized as a political tool. In this situation, the hope is to build a force so capable and flexible that it can go into any situation fully prepared to fight and win. The dangers of such an organization are many. First there must be a dollar amount that the nation is willing to fund in developing this force. Additionally, contingencies must be pre-planned and well organized to ensure full coverage of military responsibilities that include likely areas of civil upheaval and war involving lesser powers especially in areas of a vital national interest.

**BUDGET:** Following both World War I and World War II, the United States refocused its attention on economic issues. In both cases the nation's desire was to reap the benefit of the peace. The men and women that had fought in these wars were expected back home to fight a new war, one to create prosperity. The massive debt had to be eliminated and dollars that had once been used to ensure the common defense would now be used to infuse programs to ensure domestic tranquillity and promote the general welfare. Thus, as the national budget was realigned to meet this new task, the military budgets were slashed and the mighty industrial facilities converted from production of weapons to that



of cars, radios, and other consumer goods. Since the end of the Cold War, the same pattern has been occurring. Real defense spending fell 25 percent between 1990 and 1995, and is on course for another 15 percent reduction by 2000. When measured as a share of GDP, U.S. defense spending is at the lowest point it has been since 1950.<sup>34</sup>

Defense Outlays (Billions of Constant 1995 Dollars)					
Year	Total Spending		Selected Categories		
		% of GDP	Procurement	Maintenance	Personnel
1970	\$345.6	8.3	\$90.9	\$91.3	\$126.6
1980	\$245.9	5.1	\$53.1	\$82.1	\$75.8
1985	\$342.9	6.4	\$95.5	\$98.3	\$92.1
1990	\$358.3	5.5	\$97.0	\$105.7	\$90.4
1995	\$271.6	3.9	\$54.7	\$90.1	\$70.8
2000E	\$230.6	2.9	\$42.3	\$80.6	\$63.2

Source: Office of Management and Budget

Figure 1

The proposed budget(above) may be overly optimistic because it includes long-term plans which rest on unduly optimistic assumptions. For instance, using the economic assumptions of the White House Office of Management and Budget, Pentagon plans assume that the annual inflation rate will remain at 2.2 percent for six years, beginning in fiscal 1997, except for fiscal 1999, when it ticks up to 2.3 percent.<sup>35</sup>

During periods when dollars move away from the military in favor of domestic programs, readiness remains relatively level as stock piles of supplies and equipment are consumed. However, once such stockpiles are depleted and replacements are not acquired, readiness begins decreasing. While this scenario is playing itself out, the industry that had produced these stocks will search for alternative ways to earn a profit or go out of business. Along with these industries, the military loses the nation's expertise and industrial capacity to produce these items. Of course the industries could be brought

back, the expertise redeveloped and the capacity regained; such rearmament would come with a hefty price tag and significant time lag.

At the macro level one can divide the military budget into four major areas: Force Structure, Training, Operations, and Procurement. Procurement contains the most promise for budget reduction without being overly detrimental to readiness. Force structure appears to be a lucrative target because personnel are directly tied to pay and other entitlements. Cuts in this area produce easily identified and measured results but may result in insufficient structure to accomplish the military mission when the need arises. Procurement provides maneuver room due in part to the sheer size of the dollar figures and, also, the efficiencies that can be, and in many cases, have been gained by changes in federal procurement practices rules and regulations. Training is a more difficult target due to the arbitrary nature of the effect of lowered training budgets or changes in training practices. In addition, training received during other-than-war operations does not necessarily translate into the required degree of readiness and therefore can not replace a structured training regimen. Operations are the least favorable area for reducing the military budget due to the difficulty in determining the type, location, length, and nature of future campaigns. Another target of opportunity does exist, that of pork-barrel spending. The Heritage Foundation contends the 1995 defense budget: includes \$11 billion worth of non-defense spending. According to defense analyst John Luddy, nondefense items included \$14.4 million to be spent on the Summer Olympics.<sup>36</sup>

Within the military itself, officer evaluation criteria creates an additional hindrance to slashing the military budget. The successful management of large sums of

money associated with an acquisition program gives high ranking officers more clout and may lead to advancement ahead of their peers. During the Reagan buildup, the Secretary of the Army was judged as successful, for, despite the eclipse of ground warfare by strategic and tactical air- and sea-borne weapons his budget rose 30 percent (after inflation), compared with the 26 percent for the Navy and 40 percent for the Air Force.<sup>37</sup> This process tends to pull toward more expensive, instead of more efficient weapons systems, and policies that protect so called "rice bowls" beyond the good of the military or the nation.

## **MILITARY STRATEGY**

The second hypothesis is that America's military strategy currently calls for the capability to conduct operations in two simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, major regional conflicts. However, in the absence of a major regional conflict, military operational tempo will remain at high levels while conducting Operations Other Than War(OOTW). These high levels of military operational tempo will be destructive to the long range readiness of America's armed forces. This hypothesis will be divided and discussed using the topics of military strategy and operational tempo.

Military strategy has changed often during this country's history. At the end of World War I, the nation withdrew to its borders in an isolationist mode. In May 1934, Norman Davis, the head of the American delegation to the World Disarmament Conference, removed any hope that the New World would come to the aid of the Old by declaring that the United States "would not participate in European political negotiations and settlements and would not make any commitment whatever to use armed forces for the settlement of any disputes anywhere."<sup>38</sup> Then following World War II, the nation

developed a more engaged role in the international arena. The Marshall Plan for restoration of war-torn Europe established the unorthodox policy of financial outlays as a means of influence. The unchallenged lead in military weaponry established by our development of the Atomic Bomb was short lived, and the Soviet Union stepped up to challenge the United States lead in world affairs. This initiated a commitment to oppose communism around the world at every opportunity, and indirectly led us into the Korean conflict. Following that conflict, the Cold War ensued marked by a period of deterrence. The development of weapons of such destructive powers that their employment could mark the end of the world were characteristic of the era. "Massive retaliation" put the United States in the position of having to choose between nuclear war and retreat, and ignored the prospects of localized or brush-fire wars. In effect, there was no graduated deterrent to different degrees or types of aggression.<sup>39</sup>

Following the Cold War, the U.S. military has had to quell situations all over the world and has begun to look like the world's policeman. The United States even received financial restitution for military activities conducted, such as the military action against Iraq in 1991. The real problem in terms of military strategy is determining the type of military needed if the U.S. is to continue in this venue. U.S. military strategy has moved away from the preparation for global conflict toward that of multiple major regional conflicts, perhaps simultaneous in occurrence.

Size of selected elements of DOD's Force Structure			
	Number of each element (a)		
DOD Force Structure Element	1987	1993	1999
Active Army Divisions	18	14	10
Air Force fighter Wings	25	16	13
Navy Carriers	14	13	12(b)
Navy Ship Battle Forces	568	435	346
Marine Divisions	3	3	3
a-Numbers include active component forces only and are actual as of the end of fiscal years 1987 and 1993 and planned as of the end of fiscal year 1999.			
b-Includes one carrier in the Navy Reserves			

Source: DOD, Report on the Bottom Up Review (Oct. 1993)

Figure 2

The previous table demonstrates how the military has revamped its force structure under national direction. The most dangerous threat to the nation is aggression in a region vital to its interest, for example, the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait which might have disrupted supplies of petroleum. Other circumstances that pull America into conflict will be similar to those recently occurring in Bosnia, Somalia, or Rwanda, places not of vital interest to the nation, but that engender national humanitarian feelings

**OPERATIONAL TEMPO:** "We have learned that we can't be the world's policeman...We all say that "nowadays," though few were saying it a few years ago...Then we were saying, If there is a threat to freedom anywhere at any time, we will be there...Few talk like that anymore."<sup>40</sup> But this sentiment still exists. The U.S. military has been deployed around the world more since the end of the Cold War than at any other time in our history. There are three primary problems associated with the high level of operational tempo; funding, training, and morale.

In 1994, our total shortfall due to contingency operations was \$387 million. This shortfall was partially corrected by receipt of \$124 million in supplemental funding from Congress and \$56 million from the Defense Emergency Relief Fund. To cover the remaining \$207 million shortfall we had to take the following actions: defer ship supply and equipment purchases; defer ship inactivations; ground aircraft just returned from deployments; reduce flying hours for selected aviation squadrons; defer depot and intermediate level maintenance on ships; and postpone real property maintenance and other needed infrastructure investments.<sup>41</sup>

In addition to these funding issues, the military suffers from the inability to train while participating in these real world contingency operations. Operations that are not vital to our national interests may represent an inefficient use of military forces. The inefficient nature of these operations is primarily economic, but such operations also cause the focus of military forces to blur and leads to reduced levels of readiness for front line fighting forces. In addition to standard sustainment costs associated with these less than vital missions, the costs associated with maintaining an additional military force in a degree of readiness to meet requirements vital to national interest are incurred. Maintaining this additional military force in readiness will allow the initiation of vital operations while other forces either continue their nonvital missions or redeploy to train to required degree of readiness and subsequently deploy to the vital area. This process burns already scarce dollars, but the fallacy in this argument is military force, unprepared due to the lapse of training, will not have the time to conduct necessary readiness training and the military force will likely be redeployed directly to the vital area. When training readiness is overlooked while making the deployment decision, as it was in late June 1950, American servicemembers will pay the ultimate price.

Lastly, the morale of military forces suffers from high operational tempo. The practice of deploying Sailors and Marines on scheduled six month deployments to create

a forward presence often exacerbates the problem. These forward deployed units are the primary response units for contingency operations, and the best laid schedules become obsolete once contingency operations have begun. When the 24th MEU returned from a recent six-month deployment aboard amphibious landing ships and stints near Bosnia and Somalia, the unit was ordered back aboard its ships after only days in the United States so that it could beef up U.S. military presence off the coast of Haiti.<sup>42</sup>

The declining force structure, illustrated in the figure 2, combined with the tendency to be engaged in more operations worldwide magnifies the operational tempo problem. As Daniel R. Coats, R-Ind., Senate Armed Services Committee member, said in a 1 July 1994 floor speech, "Our commitments have not declined...We are simply asking more and more with fewer and fewer people."<sup>43</sup>

## **DOCTRINE**

The third hypothesis is that current doctrine does not facilitate adequate preparations for military action the next time a vital national interest is threatened. This hypothesis will be divided and discussed using the topics of doctrine, international alliances, and training.

The importance of developing doctrine at the strategic, operational, or tactical level is the focus it creates. As the World War II and Korean Conflict examples demonstrate, the lack of coherent doctrine creates confusion along the entire spectrum of training, warfighting, and weapons research, development, and procurement. Strategically, doctrine must provide the framework so that weapon systems can be efficiently procured to accomplish the joint missions of tomorrow. Doctrine

subsequently drives training to provide a seamless umbrella for forces employed in harms way. All services have, or are currently developing, doctrine that facilitate this development. A single weapon system will not decisively sway a determined enemy. An entire spectrum of combined arms needs to be developed to facilitate and support the employment of the nation's armed forces to ensure an acceptable degree of combat effectiveness.

As reported by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of World War II:

"even in the case of a very concentrated industry very heavy and continuous attack must be made," and that, "civilian morale stabilized after initial urban attacks." Attacks on urban and industrial targets in Germany proved less useful than those on Nazi transportation, the survey showed. German war production peaked in 1944 despite relentless bombing, but much material never reached the front. Taken together, the survey reports suggested air power was relatively ineffective unless used to incinerate enemy cities on an indiscriminate scale, as in Japan, or employed in concert with ground and naval forces, or delivered with a precision attainable only after months of effort and the destruction of enemy fighter forces. As Walter Millis later wrote, the decisive factor in WW II was not independent airpower but rather "the mechanization of the ground battlefield with automotive transport, with the tactical airplane and above all with the tank." The war punctured the dream of air power as capable of swift, decisive attack on the enemy's jugular.<sup>44</sup>

Jointness is the latest and perhaps the best attempt at revamping the paradigm and will probably lead to restructuring the entire military. The Army's Force 21 and JCS's Joint Vision 2010 are philosophies to help create a seamless umbrella of offensive and defensive Joint capabilities to reduce redundancies and build synergy.

It is more important initially that doctrine exists, rather than what the doctrine is, because focus creates efficiency. The benefits of having a doctrinal goal is that



professional military and congressional figureheads will debate the pros and cons of the doctrine. This debate will start a wild fire of discussion concerning applicable strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the doctrine throughout the ranks of our military and Congress alike. The professional military training provided from this analysis is priceless with respect to our nations military readiness. Our doctrine has begun to materialize. President Clinton's 1992, Bottom Up Review, produced doctrine stating the need for a capability to conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. This doctrine will be reinforced or reshaped when the Quadrennial Defense Review report is released. Some developing ideas in this area are as follows: General Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, advocates designing some units specifically to conduct peacekeeping style missions.<sup>45</sup> Army General George Joulwan, Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe and Commander In Chief of NATO, advocates the ability to conduct a half-dozen "lesser regional contingencies," or LRCs.<sup>46</sup> Senator John McCain, R-Arizona, and Chairman of the Senate Arms Services Subcommittee on Readiness has been pushing an idea to help ensure readiness given budgetary reductions and levels of operational tempo he calls tiered readiness. That is keeping certain military units, those that would be the first deployed, at a higher degree of readiness than units, who would have a certain time frame to become fully manned, equipped, and trained should their use become necessary. He proposes three tiers of readiness;

...deployed units -- and those that would be first to deploy in a crisis -- at the peak of training, fully manned and supplied. (A) second tier of units that might be needed in some contingencies but would not be expected to be the first to deploy. These would include U.S.-based combat air forces, ground-based air and missile defense systems along with long-range strike aircraft. (And) A third, and still lower, readiness level would be set for units that could take up to six months to deploy. These would include

heavy ground forces, air forces that need airfields in theater to operate, and naval forces not needed until six months into a conflict.<sup>47</sup>

An issue that goes hand in hand with this tiered readiness plan is that of mobilization.

The speed with which we can man, equip, and train units for deployment directly effects the deterrence imposed by this concept.

Whatever doctrine we align with, the imperative is that it is advocated in the Joint arena, bought into by all services, and openly discussed throughout the military and Congress. In the late 19th century, a book written by Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on History, guides the nation to this very day. It swayed the United States to build a capable fleet, not because we had to, but because we wanted to.<sup>48</sup> We need that kind of influence today.

**INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES:** Key to the emerging nature of world politics is the ability to quickly form alliances in response to aggressive actions around the globe. It is not the place of the United States to be the global policeman but rather to provide the leadership to organize and maintain a system that would accomplish these functions without expecting preferential treatment for ourselves. Our leadership should be used to influence the world to openly participate in international matters. Even when in positions allowing less than total agreement with international issues, nations need to participate in the decision process at some level. The way to maintain order in this vastly divergent world is to lay out rules, ensure infractions are known worldwide, and levy consequences of the infraction in a timely manner using an international body without prejudice. The

appearance of always being concerned for our own good at the expense of others and never bending for the good of the world must be avoided.

**TRAINING:** Good discipline is at the heart of what military training is about. The professional military member uses discipline to ensure preparedness by constantly improving leadership and technical military skills. Following World War I, the German military created an environment that promoted the open discussion of military matters, from strategic doctrine to tactical employment of arms. This open communication produced perhaps the most significant advancement in military affairs of the 20th century, the Blitzkrieg or "lightning war." It completely changed the operational employment of forces as it had been practiced for ages. The doctrine was developed in open forum, the equipment to implement the doctrine was developed and procured, and then the doctrine was trained to and studied at all levels. The professionalism of the German military during this period allowed a major body of knowledge to be articulated, shaped and reshaped, and finally cast as a devastatingly effective answer to the static tactics of World War I. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak puts it this way;

I believe that the basic training, leadership and discipline which are needed to be effective in full-scale warfare will always stand Marines in good stead during peacekeeping or other operations....I believe the most important long-term investment in combat readiness we can make lies in the professional military education of our leaders...Producing Marines who can adapt to a complex, dynamic battlefield and who are not afraid to "think outside the box" will be essential to achieving success on the chaotic battlefields of the future.<sup>49</sup>

## **PROCUREMENT**

The fourth hypothesis is that procurement practices must fully accommodate the theories of jointness on a cultural level to ensure maximization of limited resources. This hypothesis will be divided and discussed using the topics of research and development, modernization, and acquisition reform.

Federal procurement is big business and the military is by far the largest player. Declining defense budgets have produced major impacts on the American defense procurement community which is searching for revolutionary methods to stretch the defense dollar. History has shown that war can be just over the horizon, but for the defense industries, being so dependent on military funding, it is a matter of survival to maintain a share of the defense industry or be forced out of business. The very real danger that a defense contractor could go broke if he loses a contract, drives the contractors to conduct independent research and development in an attempt to find something the military can not live without. This trend pushes the military into a "tail-wagging-the-dog" scenario, in which development is not following a preconceived doctrinal requirement and therefore stovepipe systems are developed and, if left unchecked, can proliferate. The effect of this proactive research and development is to reduce the effectiveness of the seamless umbrella and inefficient use of the limited dollars available. The debate about how much to spent on defense has existed throughout history. In the days of the feudal system it was easier to answer. In our country's history as indicated in the section on budget, the amount has generally been under ten percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). It was proposed to be as high as twenty percent and is

currently running around 3 percent of GDP. Representative Leggett, D-Ca, who would like to see a percentage relationship established between defense and domestic expenditures, states:

We have to get into a balanced economy again...."Let's agree that a certain percentage of our income should be voted for defense--say fifty or sixty percent of our federal budget." ....then you could apportion that among to the various services and let them provide the best defense possible within that framework. ....Unless we do this there will be tremendous pressure to deploy a multitude of systems under development each vying for more and larger defense budgets....I would rather not have us decide on a political basis which of them to deploy. I would rather have the decision made by the professional soldiers we have trained with our tax dollars.<sup>50</sup>

Research and development, force modernization, and acquisition reform are popular topics with today's military professional and are addressed below.

**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:** Prior to World War II, The huge surplus of weapons from World War I encouraged complacency in the military as well as in Congress about promoting new weapons. As an official Army historian later admitted, the Military as well as Congress "knew tactics and strategy far better than they knew supply."<sup>51</sup> The examples demonstrate the effects of a poor research and development program. Today we must ensure the closest relationship possible between the scientists and the military at all levels; from pure sciences through experimental development programs to create a synergistic effect within the team. The scientific advances made during the second world war, such as the proximity fuse and radar, reinforce the need for a continuous scientific effort at all levels from the pure sciences to advanced concept demonstrations. The scientific community invoked the ideology of preparedness to advance their claims for peacetime research. Scientists often articulated the ideology

more aggressively than their military colleagues...Even before the postwar planning began, they argued that Allied weakness and naiveté had caused the war (WW II).<sup>52</sup> Weapons research and development can not prevent wars but it can provide a great deal of deterrence against direct attack. However, today, this deterrence will not heavily influence a 3rd world nation state not to conduct operations that it perceives as in its national interests and not in direct opposition to a major power. The key is to conduct research and development aimed at the focused doctrinal concepts to provide that seamless umbrella to the military. It is not weapons systems on the shelf that help our men and women but weapon systems in their hands.

**MODERNIZATION:** At the center of this issue is long-term readiness versus current readiness. Dollars are being taken from planned upgrades to operationally deployed systems to fund current operations, training, and maintenance requirements. This practice inflates current readiness levels at the expense of future readiness levels. Full recapitalization of the existing force structure will require an increase in the procurement account to some \$60 billion per year.<sup>53</sup> Others argue that only \$30 billion per year is needed, but, regardless of which number is correct another important aspect is again; what are the requirements of the military in the long run? Modernization has to be conducted to remain a viable power in the future and must align with established doctrinal concepts.

**ACQUISITION REFORM:** Acquisition reform generates a great deal of attention these days and is believed to be a virtual gold mine for savings. Monies saved in this manner

can be used for modernization purposes or to fund contingency operations not otherwise funded. The concept is to integrate the military and defense contractors to facilitate innovation and risk management implementing the best business practices in use in the business environment today. Mr. John Douglass, ASN(RDA), stated in a memorandum dated March 19, 1996, "Acquisition Reform is a top priority within the Navy." The other services are as much involved in this agenda as the Navy and for good reason. But why should acquisition reform save money?

As the cold war set in, special-purpose hardware displaced mass-produced weaponry with a vengeance: the share of military demand met by specialized equipment escalated to 90 percent by the early 1960's. A single weapon system might go through thousands of changes in specifications after the contract was awarded. The ability to respond flexibly to the changing needs of a single military client stood in stark contrast to the design and marketing practices of commercially oriented industries.<sup>54</sup>

Procurement must be focused, by need--determined by doctrine--to eliminate the ludicrous numbers of contract modifications which have historically driven costs through cost ceilings. Follow-on generations of systems began to increase in price exponentially. The latest army tank, the M-1, costs seven times as much as the Sherman tank of WW II. Radar guided missiles like the Sparrow and the Phoenix, used in aerial dogfights, costs, respectively, ten and one hundred times more than the more reliable pioneer, the sidewinder.<sup>55</sup> These increases have a profound effect on sectors of the United States economy but the military has been paying dearly.

The savings potential of acquisition reform has been demonstrated to the military. To illustrate his contention that the new acquisition rules were letting pentagon dollars go

farther, former Secretary Perry cited the purchase of a fleet of Army satellite communications terminals mounted in Jeep-like "Humvees:"

At the program's inception early in fiscal 1992, the cost was estimated at \$790 million. A decision to seek competitive bids on the contract dropped that price to \$660 million. Then Perry's new simplified contracting rules kicked into effect, slicing the estimated cost to \$550 million. But, according to Pentagon spokesman, the real savings came from additional competitive pressure once firms that had been put off by the old contracting rules decided to enter the bidding. The final cost was \$250 million, less than one-third the estimate only four years ago.<sup>56</sup>

Savings have come from a combination of implementing best business practices, eliminating unnecessary military specification requirements, and cost as an independent variable. In addition, the total life cycle cost of systems and contractor's past performance are being used as selection criteria during the contract award process.

## CONCLUSION

My first hypothesis; *that American culture supports the armed forces when required to respond to threats to vital national interests. Alternatively, when no apparent threat to vital national interests exists, short term domestic economic issues override military requirements. Military requirements remain secondary until such time when vital national interests are again challenged and American bloodshed becomes probable, is substantiated.* American culture will remain focused on its primary concern, the rights and needs of the individual citizen, and promote domestic economical issues to further that concern. Only when a threat to a vital national interest materializes will this focus shift away, albeit temporarily, from that focus. As demonstrated time and again throughout our history, the shift of focus to military interests has been especially



effective when the will of the people has unified against a threat to a vital national interest. In the two examples discussed, this national will manifested itself in the timely modernization and restructuring of the military forces into viable fighting forces that would ultimately carry the day. But, when the threat to a vital national interest has dissipated, the nations focus has, without fail, returned to the promotion of domestic economic issues. This will be the case in future conflicts as well. It is the role of the government to ensure American citizens understand when a threat to a vital national interest is present and promote the necessary support. With the will of the nation behind its political and subsequently military goals as they pertain to vital national interests, this nation will rise to the requirement. But, then there are situations not vital to our national interest. It is this fact that beckon for a mobilization system. One that can raise the required personnel, ensure they are equipped with the necessary tools, and then trained to conduct the kind of warfare called for in the ensuing conflict. All of this preparation will be taking place while the nation conducts its delaying action. The first echelon of troops, those that will be deployed as delaying forces, must have the very best; equipment, training, and leadership to facilitate their mission while the mobilization matures.

My second Hypothesis; *that America's military strategy currently calls for the capability to conduct operations in two simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, major regional conflicts. In the absence of a major regional conflict, however, military operational tempo will be maintained at high levels conducting operations other than war. These high levels of military operational tempo will be destructive to the long range readiness of America's armed forces.*, is also supported. Politically, economically, and militarily we can not afford to be the world's "911" force. As a leader in the international

environment, it is imperative that the United States remains engaged. We need to utilize our leadership to initiate and coordinate appropriate responses to world issues that, for humanitarian or political reasons, threaten the stability of the world even when not directly relating to a vital national interest. In certain situations, initiating an early response from the international community can ensure the problem is alleviated before it can develop into a threat to a vital national interest. Having said that, there are limits to the capabilities of the United States military, brought on by lowered budgetary support, to actively participate in all these situations. Operational tempo must be controlled to maintain morale, and allow for other critical issues such as training, maintenance, professional military education, and modernization of the forces while not depleting the military budget. The United States must not abstain from operations of a lesser criticality to our national interests, but, the tempo has to be controlled at the highest level, in a predetermined manner, allowing budgetary relief and the conduct of other military requirements.

My third hypothesis; *that current doctrine does not facilitate adequate preparations for military action the next time a vital national interest is threatened*, is only partially substantiated. Doctrine provides the military a philosophic approach for how they will minimize the risk of implementing political policies by other means. Current doctrine does not sufficiently focus effort on critical issues relating to capabilities and readiness especially in the area of jointness. The services are putting a great deal of effort into developing doctrine to lead them into the 21st century, but they are not there yet. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2010 attempts to bring the services under a single umbrella. The Quadrennial Defense Review will

validate the appropriateness of the emerging doctrine and provide the military with renewed direction. Doctrine does not sufficiently coordinate and consolidate services goals, establish individual, unit, or joint training requirements, or promote open communication within and between services. Coordinated and consolidated service goals are needed to maximize economy of scale across the military. Individual, unit, and joint training are all important to the military. At every level of this training another aspect of survival on the battle field is presented, and needs to be learned prior to combat operations to reduce the likelihood that unprepared troops are ordered into harms way. Promoting open communications is essential in facilitating doctrinal evolution by promoting analysis and discussion of the implications of strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine. As presented in Alice in Wonderland, "If you don't know where you want to go, either road will do."

My forth hypothesis; *that procurement practices must fully accommodate the theories of jointness on a cultural level to ensure maximization of limited resources toward well outlined and mutually supporting goals for the United States military as a whole*, is supported. While it is true that the military budget has a large effect on all phases of the procurement process, the most impact results from inefficient use of the dollars that are available. The nation must develop a strategy that will lead it, both politically and militarily, into the future. Naturally, this is a difficult task in the absence of any well defined threats to the nation's vital interests. Still, both politically and militarily, a strategy is necessary to focus our efforts in many areas, including procurement, doctrine, organization, and training to name a few. Already, the Federal

Acquisition Reform initiatives have made great advances in creating a more efficient procurement process. More can be done and the military can lead the way. Jointness seems to be the wave of the future, because among its promises are, reduced redundancy and synergistic procurement practices. To achieve potential benefits though, the services have to truly buy into the concept and show cooperation for the good of the entire military without feeling threatened by sister services.

The beginning of this research paper proposed that a nation can not be completely ready for war. As President Eisenhower said to a House committee;

"You can not be ready on M-day...For one thing, you cannot be ready psychologically on M-day. It takes a Pearl Harbor to inspire us to face the necessity of fighting, and we cannot be ready that day." There may ensue a protracted struggle in which the decisive factor might be not M-day readiness but the nation's ability to rapidly mobilize its total resources, including its navy and army. The nation that relied too heavily on a powerful M-day force would then confront the dilemma faced by the United States in 1941: whether to throw its small professional army immediately into battle or to use it as a training cadre for building up a force adequate to defeat the enemy. Such a dilemma would be even more excruciating if, as all predicted, the course of war were swifter in the future.<sup>57</sup>

The will of the people to fully support a war effort is perhaps the most critical thing effected by the President. If he is to commit troops to an operation, it is incumbent on him to garner the support of the nation--When repeatedly omitted this consideration may strain operational tempo. On the other hand, the military should be employed even when operations ultimately strain operational tempo if supported with popular will. Heavy operational tempo can be eased by reducing operations while maintaining a steady force structure or by increasing force structure while maintaining operational tempo. Dollars are the ultimate driving force behind readiness, assuming leadership has met its

responsibilities. It should not be the individual sailor, soldier, airman, or marine that pays the price for heavy military involvement. Rather, it is the nation that must carry the burden, for it is our mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, daughters, sons, wives, and husbands that man the nations military and they deserve the best in support of our nation.

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- <sup>2</sup> Ibid, 1.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid, 2.
- <sup>4</sup> I.C.B. Dear, *The Oxford Companion to World War II*, 2(New York:Oxford U.P., 1995), 814.
- <sup>5</sup> Martin Blumenson, *Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February, America's First Battle's 1776-1965*, ed. Charles E. Heler and William A. Stofft, (Kansas: UP of Kansas, 1986), 243.
- <sup>6</sup> Thomas Parrish, *The Simons and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II*, 3(New York:Murray Printing, 1978), 444.
- <sup>7</sup> Peter Andrews, *A Place to Be Lousy In, World War II Chronicles*, supplement to American Heritage, (USA:Forbes, Inc.,1996), 38.
- <sup>8</sup> Blumenson, 227.
- <sup>9</sup> Andrews, 32.
- <sup>10</sup> Blumenson, 229.
- <sup>11</sup> Blumenson, 235.
- <sup>12</sup> Blumenson, 262.
- <sup>13</sup> Blumenson, 235.
- <sup>14</sup> Blumenson, 236.
- <sup>15</sup> Andrews, 39.
- <sup>16</sup> Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War*, (New Haven:Yale UP, 1977), 6.
- <sup>17</sup> William J. Davies, Unpublished reserch paper, "Task Force Smith; A Leadership Failure, U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992.
- <sup>18</sup> T.R.Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness*,

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(New York:Macmillan, 1963), ch24p13.

<sup>19</sup> T.R Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War; A Study of Unpreparedness*, (New York:Macmillan, 1963), ch24p5.

<sup>20</sup> Fehrenbach, ch24p6.

<sup>21</sup> Flint, Roy K., *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950, America's First Battles: 1776-1965*, Ed Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, (Kansas:Kansas UP, 1986), 269.

<sup>22</sup> Fehrenbach, ch24p3.

<sup>23</sup> William J. Davies, Unpublished reserch paper, "Task Force Smith; A Leadership Failure, U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992.

<sup>24</sup> Fehrenbach, ch24p13.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, ch24p8.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, ch24p17.

<sup>27</sup> T.A. Heppenheimer, *Build-Down*, American Heritage magazine, December 1993, 34.

<sup>28</sup> Fehrenbach, ch24p10.

<sup>29</sup> Carl V. Clausewitz, *On War*, ed Micheal Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jeresy:Princeton UP, 1976), 89.

<sup>30</sup> Sherry, Michael S., *Preparing For The Next War*, (New Haven:Yale UP, 1977), 77.

<sup>31</sup> Knoll, Erwin and Judith Nies McFadden. *American Militarism 1970: Congressional Conf on the Mil Bdgt and National Priorities*, (New York:Viking Press, 1969), 6.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>34</sup> Ed Rubenstine, *Gunning for Defense*, National Review, 12 June 1995, 16.

<sup>35</sup> Pat Towell, *Military Readiness:DOD needs to Develop a more Comprehensive Measurement System*, (Letter Report, 27 October 1994, GAO/NSIAD-95-29), 626.

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- <sup>36</sup> William Mathews, *Deutch: Force Adequately Ready*,. Army Times, 16 January 1995, 19.
- <sup>37</sup> Markusen, Ann and Joel Yudken, *Dismantling The Cold War Economy*, (United States:BasicBooks, 1992), 99.
- <sup>38</sup> Raymond G. O'Conner, *Force and Diplomacy in America*, (Miami:U of Miami Press, 1972), 63.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid, 10.
- <sup>40</sup> Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden. *American Militarism 1970: Congressional Conf on the Mil Bdgt and National Priorities*, (New York:The Viking Press, 1969), 112.
- <sup>41</sup> Department of the Navy. *1995 Posture Statement:The Navy-Marine Corps Team*. (DTIC:19950308 234, 1995), 24.
- <sup>42</sup> Towell, Pat. *Keeping the Fighting Edge:Monitoring Vital Signs*. (Congressional Weekly Report, 23 July 1994, 1996), 1.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid, 1.
- <sup>44</sup> Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War*, (New Haven:Yale UP, 1977), 231.
- <sup>45</sup> Naylor, Sean D., *Two Wars, Two Opinions*. Army Times, 20 January 1997, 3.
- <sup>46</sup> Matthews, William, *Ready for War, But...Would Several Peaceful Missions Prove Overtaxing?*, Air Force Times, 18 March 1996, 20.
- <sup>47</sup> Maze, Rick. *Key to Readiness is Tiers, Say Some Senators*. Navy Times, 10 June 1996, 37.
- <sup>48</sup> Heppenheimer, T.A. *Build-Down: Monitoring Vital Signs*. (New York:American Heritage, 1993), 37.
- <sup>49</sup> Krulak, General C. C. *Tending to the Future of the Marine Corps*, selected comments from March 12 appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S.M.C. 1996, 4
- <sup>50</sup> Knoll, 112.
- <sup>51</sup> Sherry, 120.



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- <sup>53</sup> Johnson, Stuart and James Baker. *The FY 1997-2001 Defense Budget*, Strategic Forum, National Defense University:1996, 1.
- <sup>54</sup> Markusen, Ann and Joel Yudken. *Dismantling The Cold War Economy*. (United States:BasicBooks, 1992), 28.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid, 30.
- <sup>56</sup> Towell, Pat. *Military Readiness:DOD needs to Develop a more Comprehensive Measurement System*. Letter Report, 27 October 1994, GAO/NSIAD-95-29, 626.
- <sup>57</sup> Sherry, 230.

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